Timing is Everything — the Importance of History Detection

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Attack Demonstration



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

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

*Works equally well with other navigation (bookmark, link, . . .)

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

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

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

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Attack Summary

- Evil tab was able to control victim tab
- Even after user had navigated victim tab manually
- Was able to control timing to when user navigated to site
- Multiple attack scenarios building on this
- Intercepts user's browsing flow: *Flow Stealing*

How the Redirect Works

- Evil tab runs malicious JavaScript
- Victim tab is opened from Evil tab
- Evil tab retains a JavaScript window handle
- Via window handle, Evil tab can navigate Victim tab
- No restrictions on such navigation, except in Opera

How does the Evil Tab Know when to Redirect?

- Evil tab needs to know when to redirect
- Fairly easy if it can see victim's network traffic
- (Actually easier than in paper - use XHR Level 2)
- In most web attacks, we cannot see victim's network traffic
- What can we learn from history?

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History Detection

- A history detection attack allows attacker to test if victim has visited some URL
- Violates visitor's privacy expectation
  - Did you visit competitor's site?
  - What are your surfing habits?
  - Where do you live (did you check out the weather in Stockholm) [Janc, Olejnik'10]?

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Did you watch porn?



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A Historical History Detection Attack

- CSS history detection is a well known attack
- Visited links are rendered differently from unvisited
- `evil.com` wants to know if visitor has visited `gmail.com`
  - Use CSS to make visited links render differently form unvisited
  - Add link to `gmail.com`
  - Have JavaScript that determines how link was rendered

History of the attack

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History of the attack



Plugging the CSS History Detection Hole

- A solution was proposed in [Baron '10]
  - Lie to JavaScript about link colors
  - Restrict what rendering visited can affect (timing attacks, etc.)
- Now used in latest versions of most major browsers
- . . . but not Opera or IE8 (last for Windows XP)

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From Past to Present

- How to we use this to time our attack?
- Polling!
- Periodically test target URLs
- When one becomes visited, trigger redirect



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Limitations

- Can only trigger on URLs which
  - we can guess (no long, random parameter)
  - start out unvisited (!)
- CSS History Detection is patched in most browsers
- Seems difficult to build on other history detection attacks
  - Cache timing attacks are one-shot
  - Attacks where user is involved are too slow

Preventing Future Flow Stealing

- Even without history detection, network attacks still work
- Can we prevent the actual redirection?
- Yes, updating JavaScript window handle navigation policy
- Opera restrict cross-site navigation when current page in victim tab uses https

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Proposed new JavaScript Policy

- What is an appropriate policy for when a tab can navigate another?

Proposed new JavaScript Policy

- What is an appropriate policy for when a tab can navigate another?
- Should correspond to users' expectations for when pages can be changed
- Proposal: re-use Popup-blocker policy
- All browsers have one
- Appears to work reasonably well in practice

Summary

- Flow stealing — new type of attack
- New use of history detection
- Suggested stricter JavaScript window navigation policy

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Thank you! Questions?

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